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First-Order Logic of Proofs
Sergei N. Artemov∗ Tatiana Yavorskaya (Sidon)†
CUNY Graduate Center Department of Mathematics
365 Fifth Avenue, rm. 4319 Moscow University




The propositional logic of proofs LP revealed an explicit provability reading of
modal logic S4 which provided an indented provability semantics for the propositional
intuitionistic logic IPC and led to a new area, Justification Logic. In this paper, we find
the first-order logic of proofs FOLP capable of realizing first-order modal logic S4 and,
therefore, the first-order intuitionistic logic HPC. FOLP enjoys a natural provability
interpretation; this provides a semantics of explicit proofs for first-order S4 and HPC
compliant with Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov requirements. FOLP opens the door to
a general theory of first-order justification.
1 Introduction
The propositional logic of proofs LP revealed an explicit proof reading of modal logic S4
([1, 2]). This completed Go¨del’s effort ([9, 10]) to provide the intended provability semantics
for the propositional intuitionistic logic IPC and eventually led to a new field, Justification
Logic (cf. [3, 8]).
The intended semantics of intuitionistic logic is the semantics of proofs, also known
as Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics. It starts from Brouwer’s thesis that
intuitionistic truth is provability, i.e., a proposition is true if it has a proof (cf. [19], p. 4).
Proofs should reflect the logical structure of a sentence. In particular,
• a proof of A→ B is a construction which, given a proof of A, returns a proof of B;
• a proof of A ∧B consists of a proof of A and a proof of B;
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• a proof of A ∨B is given by presenting either a proof of A or a proof of B;
• a proof of ∀xA(x) is a function converting c into a proof of A(c);
• a proof of ∃xA(x) is a pair (c, d) where d is a proof of A(c).
Kolmogorov [11], and later Go¨del [9, 10], viewed BHK-proofs as proofs1 in classical math-
ematics. Moreover, Go¨del offered a method of connecting classical provability with intuition-
istic logic ([9]) in a way that respects the informal provability reading of IPC:
IPC ` F iff S4 ` tr(F ),2
where tr(F ) is obtained from F by prefixing each subformula of F with 2. When parsing
Go¨del’s translation tr(F ) of some formula F , we encounter a provability modality before each
subformula, which forces us to read said subformula as provable rather than true. Therefore,
Go¨del’s translation reflects the fundamental intuitionistic paradigm that intuitionistic truth
is provability. Moreover, the classical version of BHK is that which provides a non-circular
semantics for intuitionistic logic. A similar position was taken by P.S. Novikov in [15].
At that stage, the problem of finding a BHK-type semantics of proof for IPC was reduced
to developing such a semantics for S4 which proved to be quite elusive; cf. [2, 20] for more on
the history of this problem. In this context, Go¨del in [10] discusses the possibility of finding
a classical logic of proofs which could provide a semantics of proofs for S4, hence for IPC.
The next step was taken in [1, 2], where the propositional logic of proofs LP with new
atoms t:F for
t is a proof of F
was introduced. The Realization Theorem from [1, 2] demonstrated that each S4 theorem




i.e., if u is a proof of F , then t(u) is a proof of G, for an appropriate proof term t(u). The
Realization Theorem allows for the extension of this kind of explicit reading of modalities to
all theorems of S4, so S4 has a semantics via LP as anticipated by Go¨del in [10]. Since proof
terms in LP can be naturally interpreted as mathematical proofs, e.g., in Peano Arithmetic
PA, S4 and IPC received an exact provability semantics consistent with BHK-requirements.
There is a tradition to regard computational semantics for intuitionistic logic, e.g., pro-
vided by Kleene realizability, or the computational interpretation of Martin-Lo¨f Type Theory
as a variant of BHK-semantics (cf. [19]) in which ‘proofs’ are read as ‘computational pro-
grams.’ Indeed, BHK conditions are mainly satisfied under computational interpretation
1Kolmogorov in [11] wrote about “problem solutions.”
2This statement follows from [9, 14].
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with a principal exception: the original BHK cause for disjunction was intended for prov-
ability semantics and is not valid for the aforementioned computational reading. To fit the
computational model, this item has been modified by adding a new requirement
a proof of a disjunction should also specify which disjunct it proves.
This extra condition is redundant for the provability semantics since the predicate p is a
proof of F is decidable and given a proof p, we always ‘know’ which of the disjuncts it proves.
The provability BHK semantics, the logic of proofs, turned out to be quite different from
the computational BHK semantics. Both have applications far beyond the original founda-
tional area. The computational BHK semantics has strong links with Computer Science,
e.g., typed programming languages, whereas the provability BHK semantics is contributing
to epistemology, where it has led to a mathematical theory of justification (cf. [3, 8]).
1.1 Propositional logic of proofs
Let us discuss the propositional case in more detail. Proofs are represented in LP by
proof terms constructed from proof variables and proof constants by means of functional
symbols for elementary computable operations on proofs, binary ·, +, and unary !. The
formulas of LP are built by Boolean connectives from propositional atoms and those of the
form t:F where t is a proof term and F is a formula. The operations of LP are specified by
the following schemas (here A, B are arbitrary formulas and t, s are arbitrary terms):
t:(A→B)→(s:A→(t·s):B) application
t:A→(t+ s):A, s:A→(t+ s):A sum
t:A→ !t:t:A proof checker.
LP is axiomatized over the classical propositional calculus by the above schemas, the principle
t:A→A reflexivity
and the axiom necessitation rule, which allows for the specification of proof constants as
proofs of the concrete axioms
` c:A, where c is an axiom constant, A is an axiom of LP.
The intended semantics for LP is provided by proof predicates in Peano Arithmetic PA. The
proof terms of LP-language are interpreted by codes of arithmetical derivations. Operations ·,
+, and unary ! become total recursive functions on such codes. Formulas of LP are interpreted
by closed arithmetical formulas; interpretations commute with Boolean connectives and t:F
is interpreted by an arithmetical proof predicate which numerates theorems of PA. It is
established in [1, 2] that LP is complete with respect to the class of all arithmetical proof
predicates3.
The following Realization Theorem ([1, 2]) shows that LP is an exact counterpart of
Go¨del’s provability logic S4.
3The proof predicates considered here are multi-conclusion, e.g., a proof may be a proof of more than one
proposition. Single-conclusion proof predicates have their own logic of proofs axiomatized in [12, 13].
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A modal formula F is provable in S4 iff there exists an assignment (called a
realization) of proof terms to all occurrences of 2 in F such that the resulting
formula is provable in LP.
The proof of the Realization Theorem treats 2 in the style of Skolem as the existential
quantifier on proofs. Negative occurrences of 2’s are assumed to hide universal quantifiers
and hence are realized by proof variables, and positive occurrences of 2’s are realized as
existential quantifiers, i.e., by proof terms depending on these variables.
The Realization Theorem provides S4, and therefore intuitionistic logic, with an exact
BHK-style provability semantics, thus completing Go¨del’s project of formalizing the intended
provability semantics for IPC.
1.2 First-order case
Similar questions for first-order S4, FOS4, and the first-order intuitionistic logic HPC
remained open and are answered in this paper. Studies of the first-order logic of proofs
were initiated in [16] and [4] where it was established that some natural axiomatizability
questions for the first-order logic of proofs have negative answers. Paper [21] considered
so-called binding interpretations where formulas p:F were interpreted by Prf (p∗, pF ∗q) and
thus had no parameters. A complete axiomatization of the corresponding logic of proofs was
found, which, however, does not help to realize first-order modal logic.
An extension of LP by quantifiers on proofs, QLP, was considered in [7].
In this paper, we suggest a first-order logic of proofs FOLP and its exact Go¨del-style
interpretation in mathematical proofs (e.g., in Peano Arithmetic). We show that FOLP is
capable of realizing FOS4; this provides FOS4 with an exact provability semantics. Since
HPC can be faithfully embedded in FOS4 via Go¨del’s transation, this also provides HPC
with a BHK-style semantics of proofs.
2 First-order logic of proofs
Let A(x) be a formula with a parameter x. Then, in FOS4, 2A(x) also has x as a
parameter. In the provability reading of 2, this reflects the reading of 2A(x) as
given a natural parameter x = n, formula A(n) is provable.
On the other hand, FOLP cannot express the notion
formula A(x) with a free variable x is provable.
In FOLP, there are tools for representing both of the aforementioned readings of individ-
ual variables: as ‘global parameters’ or ‘local’ variables not accessible from outside the
proof/provability operator. Suppose p is being interpreted as a specific proof (in PA) and A
as a specific formula (of PA) with a free variable x. We can read p:A in two ways:
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• p proves A for a given value of the parameter x and thus the formula p:A and its truth
value depend on x. For example, p is {0 = 0}, and A is x = x; then p:A holds only
when x is substituted by 0.
• p is a proof of a formula with a free variable x and so p:A does not depend on x. For
example, p is {x = x} and A is, as before, x = x.
In the language of FOLP, the proof predicate is represented by formulas of the form
t:XA
where X is a finite set of individual variables that are considered global parameters and free
variables of this formula. All occurrences of variables from X that are free in A are also free
in t:XA. All other free variables of A are considered local and hence bound in t:XA. For
example, if A(x, y) is an atomic formula, then in p:{x}A(x, y), variable x is free and variable
y is bound. Likewise, in p:{x,y}A(x, y) both variables are free and in p:∅A(x, y), neither x nor
y is free.
Proofs are represented by proof terms which do not contain individual variables. On the
level of FOLP, this makes presentation of proofs light and manageable without sacrificing
generality.
Definition 1 Let L denote the first-order language that contains a countable set of predicate
symbols of any arity, without functional symbols and equality. The language FOLP is the
extension of L by special means to represent proofs and proof assertions, namely, the language
FOLP contains individual variables x0, x1, x2, . . . , Boolean connectives, quantifiers over
individual variables, predicate symbols Qni of any arity n (i, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .) and
• proof variables pk, k = 0, 1, 2 . . ., and proof constants c0, c1, c2, . . .;
• functional symbols for operations on proofs:
– those of LP: binary +, ·, and unary !,
– unary genx for each individual variable x;
• an operational symbol (·):X(·) for each finite set X of individual variables.
Definition 2 Proof terms are constructed as follows:
• each proof constant and proof variable is a proof term;
• if t, s are proof terms, then t · s, !t, t+ s, and genx(t) are proof terms.
Notation. 1 By X, Y , etc., we denote finite sets of individual variables. If y is an individual
variable, then we will write Xy for X ∪ {y}. An additional convention: notation Xy means,
in part, that y 6∈ X. Note also that in genx, variable x is merely a syntactic label of this
operation and is not considered an occurrence of a variable. So terms in FOLP do not contain
individual variables.
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Definition 3 Formulas are defined in the standard way with an additional clause for the
proof operator. Namely,
• If Qni is a predicate symbol of arity n and x1, . . . , xn are individual variables, then
Qni (x1, . . . , xn) is an atomic formula; all occurrences of individual variables are free.
• If A, B are formulas, then ¬A, AαB (α being a Boolean connective) are formulas;
Boolean connectives preserve free and bound occurrences of variables.
• If A is a formula and x is an individual variable, then ∀xA is a formula; ∀x binds all
occurrences of x and preserves free and bound occurrences of all other variables.
• If t is a proof term and A is a formula, then t:XA is a formula. In this formula, all
variables from X, and only from X, are free. All free occurrences of variables from X
in A are also free.
The set of free variables of a formula A is denoted by FVar(A). We use the abbreviation t:A
for t:∅A.
Definition 4 There are two types of substitutions in the language of FOLP: individual
variables and proof variables.
• Substitution of individual variables. If x, y are variables and A is a formula, then by
A(y/x) we denote the result of substitution of y for all free occurrences of x in A. We
always assume that substitution is correct, namely, there is no free occurrence of x in
A within the scope of any binding of y.
• Substitution of proof terms. Let p be a proof variable and t be a proof term. By A(t/p)
we denote the result of substitution of t for all occurrences of p in A.
Definition 5 The first-order logic of proofs FOLP is axiomatized by the following schemas.
Here A, B are formulas, s, t are terms, X is a set of individual variables, and y is an
individual variable.
A1 classical axioms of first-order logic
A2 t:XyA→ t:XA, y 6∈ FVar(A)
A3 t:XA→ t:XyA
B1 t:XA→A
B2 s:X(A→B) ∧ t:XA→(s·t):XB
B3 t:XA→(t+ s):XA, s:XA→(t+ s):XA
B4 t:XA→ !t:Xt:XA
B5 t:XA→genx(t):X∀xA, x 6∈ X
FOLP has the following inference rules:
R1 ` A,A→ B ⇒ ` B Modus Ponens
R2 ` A ⇒ ` ∀xA generalization
R3 ` c:A, where A is an axiom, c is a proof constant
axiom necessitation.
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We define derivations from the hypothesis in FOLP in the standard way. Let us recall
that in a derivation from the set of hypotheses Γ, the generalization rule may not be applied
to variables that are free in Γ.
Example 1 Let us derive (in FOLP) an explicit counterpart of the converse Barcan Formula
2∀xA→ ∀x2A.
1. ∀xA→ A - logical axiom;
2. c:(∀xA→ A) - axiom necessitation;
3. c:{x}(∀xA→ A) - from 2, by axiom A3;
4. c:{x}(∀xA→ A)→ (u:{x}∀xA→ (c·u):{x}A) - axiom B2;
5. u:{x}∀xA→ (c·u):{x}A - from 3, 4, by Modus Ponens;
6. u:∀xA→ u:{x}∀xA - by axiom A3;
7. u:∀xA→ (c·u):{x}A - from 5, 6;
8. ∀x[u:∀xA→ (c·u):{x}A] - from 7, by generalization;
9. u:∀xA→ ∀x(c·u):{x}A - from 8, since the antecedent of 8 does not contain x free.
Lemma 1 [Substitution] If FOLP ` F , p is a proof variable, and t is a proof term, then
FOLP ` F (t/p).
Lemma 2 [Deduction] If Γ, A ` F in FOLP, then Γ ` A→ F .
Theorem 1, which follows, establishes the internalization property for FOLP (though not
in its most general form, but nonetheless sufficient for purposes of this paper).
Theorem 1 [Internalization] Let p0, . . . , pk be proof variables, X0, . . . , Xk be sets of individ-
ual variables, and X = X0 ∪X1 ∪ . . . ∪Xk. Suppose that in FOLP
p0:X0A0, . . . , pk:XkAk ` F.
Then there exists a proof term t(p0, p1, . . . , pk) such that
p0:X0A0, . . . , pk:XkAk ` t:XF.
Proof. Induction on derivation of F from p0:X0A0, . . . , pk:XkAk.
Case 1. F is an axiom of FOLP. By the axiom necessitation rule, c:F is derivable for a
proof constant c. By A3, c:XF as well. Take t = c.
Case 2. F is pi:XiAi for some i. By B4, !pi:Xipi:XiAi. By A3, !pi:Xpi:XiAi. Take t =!pi.
Case 3. F follows by Modus Ponens. Then, by the Induction Hypothesis, from the given
set of hypotheses it is derivable that s1:X(G→F ) and s2:XG for some G, s1, and s2. By B2,
(s1 · s2):XF . Take t = s1 · s2.
Case 4. F follows by generalization, i.e., F = ∀xG for some x not occurring free in the set
of hypotheses. In particular, x 6∈ X. By IH, s:XG for some s. By B5, s:XG→genx(s):X∀xG,
hence genx(s):X∀xG. Take t = genx(s).
Case 5. F follows by axiom necessitation, i.e., F = c:A for some axiom A and constant
c. By B4, !c:c:A. By A3, !c:Xc:A. Take t =!c. 2
In particular, given ` F , there is a proof term t containing no proof or individual variables
such that ` t:F . Such t can be chosen +-free.
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3 Realization of FOS4
Definition 6 Let A be a first-order modal formula. By realization of a formula A we mean
a formula Ar of the language of FOLP that is obtained from A by replacing all occurrences of
subformulas of A of the form 2B by t:XB for some proof terms t and such thatX = FVar(B).
To avoid unnecessary formalism, we suggest considering a realization the result of an iterated
procedure that always replaces an innermost 2B by t :XB. A realization is normal if all
negative occurrences of 2 are assigned proof variables.
Remark 1 If Ar is a realization of A, then for every subformula B of A,
FVar(Br) = FVar(B).
As in the propositional case [1, 2], we define a forgetful projection (·)0 of FOLP to modal
logic. The straightforward definition of t:XF as 2F does not work in first-order logic. This
is due to the fact that 2 does not bind individual variables, while the proof operator can




This yields Barcan formula ∀x2A(x)→ 2∀xA(x) which is not provable in FOS4 and not
valid under the intuitive provability interpretation of 2 (cf. Section 7). We argue that (1)
states something different than (2). Since formula t:A(x) does not contain global parameters
(open variables), it asserts that t is a proof of A(x) with a free variable x. In (2), 2A(x)
states the weaker condition that A(x) is provable for each value of x, which makes all or (2)
stronger than was suggested by (1).
A more adequate definition of the forgetful projection should not change the status of
individual variables. A possible way to meet this condition is to require that forgetful
projection binds local variables by the universal quantifier. Provability of a formula F with a
free variable y is equivalent to the provability of ∀yF . So a forgetful projection of t:{x}F (x, y)
that respects binding could be 2∀yF (x, y). This example leads us to the following definition.
Definition 7 We define the forgetful projection (·)0 of FOLP to first-order modal language
by induction on an FOLP-formula. For atomic formulas, we stipulate F 0 = F , forgetful
projection commutes with Boolean connectives and quantifiers, and for proof assertions,
(t:XF )
0 = 2∀y0 . . . ∀ykF 0, where {y0, . . . , yk} = FVar(F ) \X.
Lemma 3 If FOLP ` F , then F 0 is derivable in FOS4.
Proof. By straightforward induction on derivations in FOLP. 2
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Theorem 2 [Realization Theorem] If FOS4 ` A, then there is a normal realization Ar such
that FOLP ` Ar.
Proof. The proof is similar to that in [2] with additional consideration given to individual
variables. We consider the Gentzen-style calculus for FOS4 and prove that for every sequent
Γ ⇒ ∆ that is provable in FOS4, there exists a realization r of all formulas from Γ and ∆
such that FOLP ` (∧Γr → ∨∆r). For this purpose, we take a cut-free derivation of Γ ⇒ ∆
and construct realization for the entire derivation.
According to [18], Section 9.1.3, in addition to structural rules, the sequential calculus
for FOS4 has the following axioms:
⊥ ⇒ and P (X)⇒ P (X)
and logical rules:
Γ, A⇒ ∆, B
(R→),
Γ⇒ ∆, A→ B
Γ⇒ ∆, A, Γ, B ⇒ ∆
(L→),













In R∀, we suppose that x 6∈ FVar(Γ,∆).
The following connection between FOS4 and its Gentzen-style version GFOS4 takes place:





Cut-elimination holds in GFOS4 ([18]): if GFOS4 ` Γ ⇒ ∆, then Γ ⇒ ∆ can be derived
in GFOS4 without using the cut rule.




Proof. Suppose that D is a cut-free derivation in FOS4. We will construct a realization for
each sequent Γ⇒ ∆ in D in such a way that the formula ∧Γr→∨∆r is provable in FOLP.
Following [2], we split all occurrences of 2’s in derivation D into families of related ones.
Namely, two occurrences of 2 are related if they occur in related subformulas of premises
and conclusions of rules; we extend this relationship by reflexivity and transitivity. All rules
of GFOS4 respect polarities, hence all 2’s in every family have the same polarity, so we can
speak of positive and negative families of 2’s. If f is a positive family, then all 2’s from f
are introduced either by weakening on the right or by the rule (R2). If at least one 2 in f
is introduced by (R2), then we call f an essential family, otherwise f is called inessential
family.
9
Step 1. Initialization. To every negative or inessential positive family f we assign a
fresh proof variable p. Replace all 2A, where 2 is from f , by p:XA with X = FVar(A).
Suppose that f is an essential positive family. We enumerate the rules (R2) which
introduce 2’s from the family f . Let n(f) be the total number of such rules for the family
f . For the (R2)–rule number k in a family f where k = 1, . . . , n(f), we take a fresh proof
variable uk called a provisional variable. Finally, replace all 2A from the family f by
[u1 + . . .+ un(f)]:XA
with X = FVar(A).
After initialization is completed, all nodes in the resulting tree D′ are assigned formulas
of the logic FOLP.
Step 2. Realization. We now travel along derivation D′ from leaves to root and replace
all provisional variables by FOLP–terms. We retain the notation uj for both provisional
variables and terms substituted for them. The resulting tree is denoted by Dr. By induction
on the depth of a node in D′, we prove that after the process passes the node Γ⇒ ∆ in D′
and replaces it by Γr ⇒ ∆r,
1. sequent Γr ⇒ ∆r is derivable in FOLP4;
2. for every subformula B occurring in Γ,∆, we have FVar(Br) = FVar(B).
We do not change the realization when the process passes sequents that are not conclusions
of a (R2)–rule. All rules except (R2) are admissible in FOLP, therefore the conclusions of
those rules are derivable in FOLP as long as the premises are derivable.
The only case in which we alter realization is in rule (R2). Suppose that Γ ⇒ ∆ is
obtained by rule (R2):
2A1, . . . ,2Ak ⇒ A
.
2A1, . . . ,2Ak ⇒ 2A
The symbol 2 introduced by this rule belongs to an essential positive family f . Let this rule
have the number i among rules (R2) which introduce 2’s from this family f , and n = n(f).
Currently in Dr, the node corresponding to the premise of this rule is assigned a sequent
q1 :X1B1, . . . , qk :XkBk ⇒ B which, by the Induction Hypothesis, is provable in FOLP. The
node corresponding to the conclusion is assigned a sequent
q1:X1B1, . . . , qk:XkBk ⇒ [u1 + . . .+ ui + . . .+ un]:XB
where all qj are proof variables, all uj are either provisional variables or terms, ui is a
provisional variable, and X = FVar(B).
By the Internalization Lemma, it follows that there exists a term t such that FOLP derives
q1:X1B1, . . . , qk:XkBk ⇒ t:YB
4Which means that FOLP ` ∧Γr → ∨∆r, or equivalently, Γr ` ∨∆r.
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where Y = X1 ∪ X2 ∪ . . . ∪ Xn. Using axiom A2, we remove from Y all variables that are
not in FVar(B) and obtain Y ′ = Y ∩ FVar(B). Then, by A3, add to Y ′ all free variables of
B that were not yet there and obtain X. The resulting sequent
q1:X1B1, . . . , qk:XkBk ⇒ t:XB
is provable in FOLP. Therefore, by B3,
q1:X1B1, . . . , qk:XkBk ⇒ [u1 + . . .+ ui−1 + t+ ui+1 + . . .+ un]:XB
is also provable in FOLP. Replace provisional variable ui by t everywhere in Dr. By the
Substitution Lemma, this respects provability in FOLP. 2
Proof of the Theorem is now immediate. Since FOS4 ` A, there is a cut-free proof of
sequent ⇒ A in GFOS4. By Lemma 4, there exists its normal realization ⇒ Ar provable in
FOLP, i.e., FOLP ` Ar. 2
Corollary 1 FOS4 is the forgetful projection of FOLP.
Corollary 2 F is derivable in HPC if and only if its Go¨del translation is realizable in FOLP.
4 Parametric arithmetical semantics for FOLP
In this section, we describe the arithmetical interpretation of FOLP via proofs in Peano
Arithmetic PA. The definition of PA and related topics are given in detail, e.g., in [5, 17].
As usual, for a natural number n by n we denote the numeral SS . . . S︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
0 that represents n
in PA. We will simply write n for this numeral in case it is not misleading.
According to the classical Go¨del approach ([9, 10]), the main idea is to interpret FOLP
formulas as arithmetical formulas, proof terms as codes of proofs in PA, and proof assertions
t:XF as arithmetical proof predicates t is a proof of F in PA. The main technical problem
here is how to properly handle individual variables.
4.1 Open variables in first-order derivations
The role of X in t:XF is to provide a substitutional access to derivation t and formula F
for all variables from X. For this we have to define ‘free variables of a derivation’ in such a
way that
if a derivation D(x) with a ‘free variable x’ is a proof of a formula F (x),
then for each n, D(n) is a derivation of F (n). (3)
Surprisingly, making sense of the above-stated notion of ‘free variables of a derivation’ is
not immediate. Here is a relevant example. Let F (x) be a logical axiom with a free variable
x. Then the following is a Hilbert-style derivation D:
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F (x) - axiom;
∀xF (x) - generalization;
F (x)→(∀xF (x)→F (x) ∧ ∀xF (x)) - conjunction axiom;
∀xF (x)→F (x) ∧ ∀xF (x) - Modus Ponens;
F (x) ∧ ∀xF (x) - Modus Ponens.
Question: is the very first occurrence of x free in this derivation?
Answer 1: x is free, since it is free in F (x).
Answer 2: x is not free, since substitution (0/x) ruins the derivation. The generalization
step is no longer legitimate: one cannot conclude ∀xF (x) from F (0).
The reason for this confusion lies in the fact that Hilbert derivations are not trees and
reuse the same formulas. The true structure of this derivation is revealed by its tree-style
presentation
F (x)→(∀xF (x)→F (x) ∧ ∀xF (x)) F (x)




F (x) ∧ ∀xF (x) (4)
As we can see, axiom F (x) appears twice in this derivation in quite different substitutional
contexts. In the left branch, variable x from F (x) remains free until the root of the derivation.
In the right branch, F (x) was subjected to generalization and binding of variable x. Which
occurrences of x in this derivation are open to substitution in the way described in (3)? The
answer is given by the boldface occurrences x:
F (x)→(∀xF (x)→F (x) ∧ ∀xF (x)) F (x)




F (x) ∧ ∀xF (x) (5)
Indeed, if we denote this derivation as D(x), and the root formula as A(x), then
1. D(x) is a proof of A(x);
2. D(n/x) is a proof of A(n/x) for each n.
This observation leads us to the following convention about open occurrences of variables
in derivations. By a PA-proof d, we mean any finite collection of tree-like PA-derivations
which do not overlap, and d proves all root formulas of those derivations.
We define open occurrences of a variable in a given proof tree in PA-proofs. The idea
of an ‘open occurrence’ is that it is open for substituting a number without destroying the
proof tree: if x is open in a proof tree T (x) of a formula A(x), then T (n) is a proof of A(n).
The following definition declares as open in a proof tree only those occurrences of variables
which are safe to substitute throughout the whole tree.
1. All free occurrences of variables of root formulas are open.
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2. If x is open in F , then all free occurrences of x are open in the immediate predecessors
of F in the proof tree.
After the simultaneous substitution of n for an open variable x, the proof tree T (x) becomes
a proof tree T (n), since each node in T (n) represents the same rule as in T (x). Moreover,
if T (x) has a formula A(x) at the root node, then T (n) has A(n) at the root node.
Given a PA-proof d, we write d(X) for d with marked open occurrences of variables from
X.
Now let us see how open variables can be defined in a standard multi-conclusion deriva-
tion D which proves all formulas occurring in it. First, we assume that all derivations are
presented in a regular form, which we define as follows.
1. Derivations are supplied with a tree-like proof of each of its formulas, and
2. These trees do not overlap, i.e., each occurrence of a formula in such belongs only to
one of the trees.
It is obvious that each Hilbert-style proof can be presented in a regular form which
proves exactly the same formulas as the original derivation. The specifics of converting a
Hilbert-style derivation into its regular form do not matter.
4.2 Provability interpretation of FOLP
Let us fix a natural multi-conclusion Go¨del proof predicate
Proof (x, y) 
 x is the Go¨del number of a finite set of tree-like PA-derivations, y is the Go¨del
number of a root formula of one of those derivations.
In what follows, by a proof in PA we mean a multi-conclusion proof in the sense of
predicate Proof , that is, a finite set of tree-like PA-derivations, which proves root formulas
of those derivations.
Let X be a set of individual variables. For each arithmetical formula F , by [F (X)] we
understand a natural arithmetical term for the primitive recursive function that for each
value K = (k1, . . . , kn) of X returns the Go¨del number of the result of substituting K for
X in all free occurrences of x1, . . . , xn in F . Similarly, for each arithmetical derivation d, by
[d(X)] we mean an arithmetical term for the primitive recursive function that for each value
K = (k1, . . . , kn) of X returns the Go¨del number of the result of substituting K for X in all
open occurrences of x1, . . . , xn in d. Formally,
[F (X)] is a natural arithmetical term for λKpF (K)q,
and
[d(X)] is a term for λKpd(K)q.
In particular, if X = ∅, then [F (X)] = pFq and [d(X)] = pdq. We assume that if variable y
is not free in F , then [F (Xy)] and [F (X)] graphically coincide, and similarly for d. We will
also systematically skip brackets ‘[ ]’ in [F (X)] and [d(X)] whenever it is safe.
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As a notational example, consider arithmetical formulas F (x, y) and G(x). A natural
arithmetical term for
λnpF (n, pG(n)q)q
in full notation will be
[F (x, [G(x)])],
and in simplified notation
F (x,G(x)).
Lemma 5 For each PA-proof d, arithmetical formula F , and set of variables X, the following
formulas are provable in PA:
1. Proof (d(X), F (X))→ F (X);
2. Proof (d(Xy), F (Xy))→ Proof (d(X), F (X)), y 6∈ FVar(F );
3. Proof (d(X), F (X))→ Proof (d(Xy), F (Xy)).
Proof. To prove (1), reason in PA. Given X and the fact that d(X) is a proof of F (X), we
conclude that F (X) is nothing but a substitutional example of F such that d is a proof of
F . Since d is a specific derivation, F follows by the standard parameter-free argument from
the proof of correctness of the propositional Logic of Proofs [1, 2].
To verify (2), note that if d is a derivation of a formula F and y is not free in F , then
y is not open in the tree-like proof of F provided by d. Hence, removing y from the set of
global parameters of d does not alter the proof of F .
To prove (3), we need some straightforward combinatorics on derivations, naturally for-
malizable in PA. In particular, it reflects property (3) that a substitution of any number y
for an open variable in a derivation d of a formula F is a legitimate derivation d(y) of F (y). 2
Given Proof , we define natural recursive operations on PA-derivations that correspond
to the functional symbols ·, +, !, and genx of FOLP.
Lemma 6 There exist total recursive operations on proofs ·, +, !, and genx such that for
any proofs d and e, formulas F and G, and a set of individual variables X, the following
formulas are provable in PA:
1. Proof (d(X), (F → G)(X))→ (Proof (e(X), F (X))→ Proof ((d · e)(X), G(X)));
2. Proof (d(X), F (X)) ∨ Proof (e(X), F (X))→ Proof ((d+e)(X), F (X));
3. Proof (d(X,F (X))→ Proof (!d(X),Proof (d(X), F (X)));
4. Proof (d(X), F (X))→ Proof (genx(d)(X),∀xF (X)), x 6∈ X.
Proof. In order to find d · e, we take all formulas F → G proved by some proof tree T1 ∈ d
and F proved by a proof tree T2 ∈ e, and construct a new proof tree consisting of T1 and
T2 followed by G obtained by Modus Ponens. For d · e, we take the set of all proof trees
obtained in this way.
By d+e we understand the disjoint union of d and e.
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Given a variable x, by genx(d) we mean the collection of tree-like arithmetical derivations
each of which is a tree T ∈ d with a new root node ∀xA where A is an ‘old’ root node of T .
The only nontrivial case is ‘verifier’ ! which works as follows. Given a proof d, it recovers
the set X of all parameters open in d. Then for each subset Y of X and for each formula
F proved by d, it reconstructs the formula Proof (d(Y ), F (Y )) with free variables Y . Since
d is a proof of F , these formulas are all provable in PA. Operation ‘!’ first finds a tree-like
derivation for each of those formulas and finally, for !d, takes the set of all such derivations.
The main purpose of !d is to provide the proof of Proof (d(Y ), F (Y )) for any Y ⊆ X.
It is clear that our definition of operations ·, +, !, and genx renders all formulas 1–4 true.
Now let us show that they are provable in PA. All cases except, perhaps, the verifier are
straightforward and amount to formalizing in PA some routine combinatorial arguments.
In the case of verifier ‘!,’ we first prove (3) for the empty X: the formula
Proof ([d], [F ])→ Proof ([!d], [Proof ([d], [F ])])
is a true ∆1-sentence, therefore it is provable in PA.
Now in the case X 6= ∅, reason in PA. Let us consider a representative example which
will make the general argument rather clear. Let d be a PA-derivation {x = x}; d has one
open variable x which determines that there are only two choices for Y from the definition
of ‘!,’ i.e., Y = ∅ and Y = {x}. Verifier ‘!’ works as follows.
• Case Y = ∅. Find all formulas proved by d, in this case formula x = x, and find the
derivation d1 of formula Proof (pdq, px = xq).
• Case Y = {x}. In this case, d(Y ) is encoded by term d(x) which for each x = n returns
p{n = n}q. The only formula proved by it is n = n. This admits a direct formalization
in PA and hence Proof (d(x), [x = x]) is provable in PA with free variable x. Let d2 be
a derivation of this formula in PA.
For !d we take the disjoint union of d1 and d2. Let us prove that this operation ! does what
it should, i.e., that for all F and X,
Proof (d(X), F (X))→ Proof (!d(X),Proof (d(X), F (X))).
Consider two cases of X and reason in PA.
• x 6∈ X (e.g., X = ∅). In this case, d(X) is just pdq. The only formula for which d is a
proof is x = x. By construction, !d proves Proof (pdq, px = xq).
• x ∈ X. In this case, d(X) is just d(x), and the rest of the variables in X are of no
consequence. The only formula proved by d(x) is [x = x], and, by construction, !d(X)
proves Proof (d(x), [x = x]).
2
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Definition 8 A parametric arithmetical interpretation for the language FOLP is defined by
operations +, ·, !, and genx which satisfy Lemma 6 and an evaluation ∗ that maps
• proof variables and constants to multi-conclusion arithmetical proofs and
• predicate symbols of arity n to arithmetical formulas with n free variables. We suppose
that ∗ commutes with the renaming of individual variables.
Now we can define the interpretation t∗ of an FOLP-term t as follows: for proof variables
and constants, t∗ is given by the evaluation ∗, and we take (s·t)∗ to be s∗ ·t∗, (s+t)∗ = s∗+t∗,
(genx(t))
∗ = genx(t
∗), and (!t)∗ =!(t∗).
For formulas, ∗ commutes with Boolean connectives and quantifiers and
(t:XF )
∗ = Proof (t∗(X), F ∗(X)),
i.e., (t:XF )
∗ is evaluated by the natural arithmetical formula asserting that t is a proof of F
with global variables X.
Each derivation in FOLP generates constant specification, which is a (finite) set of formulas
c:A introduced by the axiom necessitation rule R3. We say that interpretation ∗ respects
constant specification CS if all formulas from CS are true (hence provable in PA).
Theorem 3 [Arithmetical soundness] If FOLP ` A with a constant specification CS, then
for every parametric arithmetical interpretation ∗ respecting CS, PA ` A∗.
Proof. Induction on the proof of A in FOLP.
All instances of logical axioms A1 and rules R1 and R2 are trivially provable in PA. Valid-
ity of axioms B2–B5 is secured by the definition of operations ·, +, !, and genx; see Lemma
6. Rule R3 holds once we assume that constant specification CS is respected. Provability of
A2, A3, and B1 is guaranteed by Lemma 5. 2
The following Corollaries 3 and 4 provide a provability semantics for first-order modal
logic FOS4 and first-order intuitionistic logic HPC.
Corollary 3 If FOS4 proves F , then there exists a realization of F in FOLP which is a
parametric provability tautology.
Corollary 4 If HPC proves F , then
a) the Go¨del translation of F , tr(F ), is provable in FOS4,
b) there exists a realization of tr(F ) in FOLP which is a parametric provability tautology.
Example 2 Consider intuitionistic theorem
∃xA(x)→¬∀x¬A(x) (where A(x) is atomic). (6)
Its simplified Go¨del translation ()◦ ([18], Section 9.2.1), is
2∃x2A(x)→¬2∀x¬2A(x), (7)
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which is provable in FOS4: it is easy to guess its realization in FOLP:
u:∃xv:{x}A(x)→¬w:∀x¬v:{x}A(x). (8)
Indeed, (8) is a normal realization of (6) and it remains to check that (6) is provable in
FOLP. Indeed, with F = ∀x¬v:{x}A(x), formula (8) states u:¬F→¬w:F which is obviously
provable in FOLP. By Theorem 3, any arithmetical interpretation of (8) is provable in PA.
5 Invariant parametric semantics
Arithmetical interpretation based on a specific proof predicate may yield provability
tautologies that appear as a result of the specifics of proof numbering and as such do not
represent ‘true’ provability tautologies that are invariant with respect to the choice of a proof
predicate. This invariance issue has been discussed in the context of propositional logic of
proofs in [2].
Example 3 Consider the formula
¬u:¬u:⊥. (9)
Informally, it states that no u can be proof of a (valid) statement that u is not a proof of
a contradiction. Intuitively, this does not seem right, since the arithmetical translation of
¬u:⊥ is a true decidable statement clearly provable in PA, and there is no reason to rule out
a sophisticated u that can prove ¬u:⊥. Indeed, the propositional logic of proofs LP suggests
that such a u exists: LP does not prove (9), hence, by the arithmetical completeness theorem
for LP (cf. [2]), there is a proof predicate and evaluation of u under which (9) is false, hence
u:¬u:⊥ is true.
However, this intuition is not supported by the parametric provability semantics from
Section 4 in which (9) is vacuously valid. Indeed, the standard Go¨del numbering of formulas
and proofs is monotonic and the code of the whole is strictly greater than the code of its
proper part. Therefore, if (u:¬u:⊥)∗ were true, then the code of u∗ would be less than the
code of (¬u:⊥)∗ which is less than the code of u∗ – a contradiction. This is a typical example
of an ‘accidental identity’ that is based on the specifics of coding rather than on essence.
In order to avoid such ‘identities,’ we introduce the notion of invariant parametric inter-
pretation which accepts as valid only those principles that hold for all legitimate numerations
of proofs.
We consider the class of all proof predicates that are provably equivalent to the standard
proof predicate but allow different numeration of proofs.
A proof predicate is a provably ∆1-formula Prf(x,y) for which there are provably total
recursive functions α(n) and β(n) such that
PA ` ∀x, y(Proof (x, y)↔ Prf (α(x), y)), and
PA ` ∀x, y(Proof (β(x), y)↔ Prf (x, y)).
Informally, α and β are computable translators from proofs in Prf to proofs of the same
theorems in Proof , and vice versa.
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It is convenient to not distinguish between derivations and their Go¨del numbers. In what
follows, if n is the Go¨del number of the derivation d we write [n](X), or even n(X), for
[d(X)] and, equivalently, d(X).
For each Prf -proof d and each setX of individual variables, d(X) is a natural arithmetical
term for a primitive recursive function that, for each value N of X, recovers β(d) - the Go¨del
number of a regular Proof -derivation corresponding to d, substitutes N for X in β(d), and
computes back the Prf -number of the resulted derivation:
d(X) = α(β(d)(X)). (10)
An analogue of Lemma 5 holds for this notion of d(X). In particular, for item 2 of the
lemma, suppose that Prf (d(Xy), F (Xy)). This last formula graphically coincides with
Prf (α(β(d)(Xy)), F (Xy)), from which we obtain Proof (β(d)(Xy), F (Xy)). Since y is not
free in F , by Lemma 5, Proof (β(d)(X), F (X)), from which Prf (α(β(d)(X)), F (X)), i.e.,
Prf (d(X), F (X)).
One can define operations on proofs ·, +, !, and genx in such a way that Lemma 6 holds
directly.
Definition 9 For any Prf -proofs a and b, and each finite set X of individual variables,
• (a · b)(X) = α((β(a) · β(b))(X));
• (a+ b)(X) = α((β(a) + β(b))(X));
• (genx(a))(X) = α((genx(β(a)))(X));
• (!a)(X) = α(!0β(a)(X))
where functions +, ·, and genx are defined for Proof in the previous section, and !0 is defined
similarly with ! in such a way that it satisfies the following condition: for every derivation
d, arithmetical formula F , and set of variables X,
Prf (α(d(X)), F (X))→Proof (!0d(X),Prf (α(d(X)), F (X))).
Remark 2 Let us show that such a function !0 exists. Briefly speaking, it works as follows.
Given a derivation d, it recovers the set of formulas proved by d and the set X of open vari-
ables of d. For each F of these formulas and each Y ⊆ X, we have Proof (d(Y ), F (Y ))
which is equivalent to Prf (α(d(Y )), F (Y )). Formula Proof (d(Y ), F (Y )) and, therefore,
Prf (α(d(Y )), F (Y )) is provable in PA with free variables Y ; let e be the proof of the latter.
As !0d we take the disjoint union of such proofs e for all formulas F proved by d and all
subsets Y of open variables in d.
The direct analogue of Lemma 6 holds for operations from Definition 9. For ‘·’ we
reason as follows. If Prf (a(X), (F → G)(X)) and Prf (b(X), F (X)), which is the same as
Prf (α(a′(X)), (F → G)(X)), and Prf (α(b′(X)), F (X)), then
Proof (a′(X), (F → G)(X)) and Proof (b′(X), F (X)).
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Therefore, by Lemma 6, Proof ((a′ ·b′)(X), G(X)), from which Prf (α((a′ ·b′)(X)), G(X)). But
α((a′ · b′)(X)) coincides with (a · b)(X), and we conclude the desired Prf ((a · b)(X), G(X)).
We reason similarly in the case of ‘+’ and ‘genx.’
For ‘!,’ assume that Prf (a(X), F (X)), where a(X) = α(a′(X)). Then, by definition of !0,
we obtain Proof (!0a
′(X),Prf (a(X), F (X))), therefore
Prf (α(!0a
′(X)),Prf (a(X), F (X))),
i.e.,
Prf ((!a)(X),Prf (a(X), F (X))).
Definition 10 Given a proof predicate Prf and operations on proofs ·, +, !, and genx that
satisfy Lemma 6, invariant parametric interpretation for the language FOLP is an evaluation
∗ that maps
• proof variables and constants to natural numbers (which should be thought of as Prf -
numbers of regular arithmetical derivations) and
• predicate symbols of arity n to arithmetical formulas with n free variables. We suppose
that ∗ commutes with renaming of individual variables.
For terms, ∗ commutes with operations ·, +, !, and genx. For formulas, ∗ commutes with
the Boolean connectives and quantifiers and
(t:XF )
∗ = Prf (t∗(X), F ∗(X)).
Theorem 4 [Arithmetical soundness] If FOLP ` A with a constant specification CS, then
for every invariant parametric interpretation ∗ respecting CS, PA ` A∗.
Proof. Follows immediately from analogues of Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 adapted for the
invariant setting. 2
Let us reconsider formula (9) and show that it is not valid in the invariant parametric
semantics. For this we have to find a proof predicate Prf and interpretation ∗ such that
(u:¬u:⊥)∗ holds (provable in PA).
In what follows, we assume that an injective numeration of the joint syntax of FOLP
and PA is given. Consider the following fixed-point equation that defines an arithmetical
predicate Prf (x, y).
Prf (x, y) ↔ Proof (x, y) ∨ (x = puq ∧ y = p¬Prf (puq, p⊥q)q). (11)
From (11), it immediately follows that Prf (x, y) is provably ∆1. Moreover, it is also clear
from (11) that ¬Prf (puq, p⊥q) holds and let p be the Go¨del number of its proof in PA. So,
Proof (p, p¬Prf (puq, p⊥q)q). Let α and β be identity functions except for
β(puq) = p and α(p) = puq.
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From (11), it follows that the following are provable in PA with a free variable y:
Proof (p, y)↔ Prf (α(p), y)
and
Proof (β(puq), y)↔ Prf (puq, y).
These facts are both provable in PA, hence
PA ` ∀x, y(Proof (x, y)↔ Prf (α(x), y)) and PA ` ∀x, y(Proof (β(x), y)↔ Prf (x, y)).
We conclude that Prf (x, y) is a legitimate proof predicate. We now define the interpretation
∗ that interprets u as puq. From (11), (u:¬u:⊥)∗ holds (provable in PA), hence formula (9)
is not a valid provability principle in the invariant parametric semantics.
6 Further valid principles of proofs: Barcan formula
In this section, we show that a natural explicit version of the Barcan formula is valid
under parametric and invariant parametric semantics.
Theorem 5 ∀y(t:XyA)→ t:XA is valid in parametric and invariant parametric semantics.
Proof. We first establish the validity of this principle in parametric semantics.
Lemma 7 Let A(x) and B(x) be arithmetical formulas, and suppose for two distinct nu-
merals n1 and n2, A(ni) syntactically coincides with B(ni). Then A(x) coincides with B(x).
Proof. Actually, this is an exercise in unification. Run the unification algorithm on
A(x) = B(x). If unification succeeds, i.e., yields an empty set of equations, then A(x)
coincides with B(x). Otherwise, if the unification yields an equation s = t for syntactically
different s and t, none of which is x, there is no way A(n) syntactically coincides with B(n)
for any n which contradicts the assumptions. Suppose the unification algorithm reduces
A(x) = B(x) to a finite system of equations x = t1, x = t2,... where all ti are pairwise dis-
tinct arithmetical terms, none of which contains x. If we substitute n for x in this algorithm,
the equality A(n) = B(n) will be reduced to n = t1, n = t2, . . .. Since all ti are distinct,
there can be at most one valid equation in this system, say n = t1. Since n is arbitrary,
the equality A(n) = B(n) can hold only when n coincides with t1, which contradicts the
assumptions. 2
Lemma 8 Let p(x) be a derivation in PA, and Q(x) an arithmetical formula. If for all
n = 0, 1, 2, ..., p(n) is a derivation for Q(n), then p is a derivation for Q with x as a local
variable.
Proof. Suppose p(x) = F1(x), F2(x), ..., Fk(x). From the assumptions, for each n there is an
i such that Q(n) = Fi(n). By the Pigeonhole Principle, there is an i such that Q(n) = Fi(n)
for two different n’s. By Lemma 7, Q(x) = Fi(x). 2
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Lemma 9 Principle ∀y(t:XyA)→ t:XA is derivable in PA for each parametric evaluation ∗.
Proof. Note that both Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 are formalizable in PA. Reason in PA.
Suppose for all y, t∗(X, y) is a proof of A∗(X, y). By Lemma 8, A∗(X, y) is in t∗(X) where
y is a local variable. Therefore, t∗(X) is a proof of A∗(X). 2
This proves Theorem 5 for the parametric provability semantics. In the case of the
invariant parametric semantics, the proof is as follows. Reason in PA. Suppose that
∀yPrf (t∗(Xy), A∗(Xy)).
Then, by (10), ∀yPrf (α(d(Xy)), A∗(Xy)) for some Proof -derivation d. Then
∀yProof (d(Xy), A∗(Xy)),
and, as in the parametric case, Proof (d(X), A∗(X)), hence Prf (α(d(X)), A∗(X)), i.e.,
Prf (t∗(X), A∗(X)).
2
Definition 11 First-order logic of proofs FOLPb is FOLP with ∀y(t :XyA) → t :XA as an
additional axiom.
Note that FOLPb derives an explicit version of the Barcan formula ∀x2A→ 2∀xA, namely
∀x(t:XxA)→ genx(t):X∀xA.
Corollary 5 FOLPb is correct with respect to the parametric and invariant semantics.
7 Generic provability semantics for FOLP
In (invariant) parametric semantics for FOLP, proof terms are interpreted as specific
derivations with open variables. As a result, an explicit version of the Barcan formula holds.
However, the intuitive provability semantics for first-order modal logic offers a somewhat
different account of the Barcan formula ∀x2A→ 2∀xA. According to this intuition, if A(x)
is provable for each x, it does not guarantee that ∀xA(x) is provable. In this section, we
offer a generic provability semantics for FOLP that accommodates this kind of reasoning.
As in [2], we consider the class of all proof predicates. A generic proof predicate is a
provably ∆1-formula Prf (x, y) such that for every arithmetical formula ϕ,
PA ` ϕ ⇔ for some n ∈ ω, Prf (n, pϕq) holds. (12)
Here n is called a proof and ϕ a formula proved by n. One may think of n as a label for a set
of provable formulas n̂ = {ϕ | Prf (n, pϕq)}. So ∪n∈ωn̂ is the set of all theorems of PA. Sets
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n̂ are assumed finite, and a function from n to n̂ provably computable. For convenience, we
allow n̂ to be empty for some n, e.g., let 0̂ = ∅. As in Section 5, we assume that there exist
total recursive functions α(n) and β(n) which translate proofs in Prf to proofs of the same
theorems in Proof , and vice versa, i.e.,
PA ` ∀x, y(Proof (x, y)↔ Prf (α(x), y)), and PA ` ∀x, y(Proof (β(x), y)↔ Prf (x, y)).
We also make a simplifying assumption: for each finite set Y of theorems of PA, there exists
n such that Y = n̂ and functions from the standard derivation of Y to n and back are
computable. This property holds for the standard regular proof predicate: for any finite set
of tree-like derivations, there is a proof (its disjoint union) which contains exactly their proof
trees. This assumption is not really necessary and can be replaced by a weaker condition.
The following notion of a proof function is a generic analogue of the notion of a proof
with a given set of global parameters.
Definition 12 Given a generic proof predicate Prf and a set of individual variables X, a
proof function is a pair (p(X),F) such that
1. p(X) is a provably total recursive function from the set of values of X to Prf -proofs,
fairly represented in PA by a term p(X); F = (F1, . . . , Fn) is a finite set of arithmetical
formulas (considered provable by this proof function).
2. PA ‘knows’ that for all values of X, p(X) proves substitutional examples of formulas
from F and only them, that is,
PA ` Prf (p(X), y)↔
n∨
i=1
(y = [Fi(X)]); (13)
3. PA ‘knows’ that each formula proved by p(X) actually holds, i.e., for each formula F
from F ,
PA ` Prf (p(X), F (X))→F. (14)
As a notational convention, we will speak about a proof function p(X) and the set of
formulas p̂ as F from the definition. Note that formulas from p̂ may have free variables
other than from X, or do not have some variables from X; these nuances are automatically
handled by notations [F (X)].
Example 4 Each Prf -proof d may be regarded as a proof function for each X with the set
of formulas F being the set of all formulas proven by d. In particular, Lemma 5 adapted for
the invariant setting yields that (14) holds in this case, too.
There are proof functions that are not substitutional instances of specific derivations; we
will see examples later in this section (i.e., in Examples 5 and 6).
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Remark 3 Given Z ⊆ X, we sometimes need to regard a proof function p(Z) as a proof
function of X. Namely, for U = X \ Z we state the existence of a proof function pU(X) for
which p̂U = p̂.
Given X, we calculate pU as follows:
1. calculate p(Z);
2. find a derivation d = β(p(Z)) which proves exactly the same formulas;
3. substitute given values of U in d to get [β(p(Z))](U);
4. find a Prf -proof α([β(p(Z))](U)).
So, we define the value of pU(X) as α([β(p(Z))](U)). It is easy to derive in PA that
Prf (p(Z), A(Z))↔ Prf (pU(X), A(X))
using the following equivalences:
Prf (p(Z), A(Z)) ↔ Proof (β(p(Z)), A(Z)) ↔
↔ Proof ([β(p(Z))(U)], A(ZU)) ↔
↔ Prf (α([β(p(Z))](U)), A(X)).
The reflexivity condition also holds. Argue in PA. Given X, Z, and Prf (pU(X), F (X)) we
conclude Prf (p(Z), F (Z)) whence F holds by reflexivity of p.
In what follows, in particular, the proof of Lemma 15, when speaking about a sum of
p(X) and q(Z) with Z ⊆ X we mean the sum of p(X) and qU(X).
The notion of proof form from Definition 13 is a generic analogue of the notion of a proof
as a finite family of derivations with global parameters X from a fixed set Y .
Definition 13 Fix a proof predicate Prf and a finite set of variables Y . By a proof form
{pX(X)} we understand a family of proof functions pX(X), one for each X ⊆ Y such that
the following two properties are provable in PA for every arithmetical formula A:
• Monotonicity : p̂X ⊆ p̂Xy.
• Coherence: p̂Xy \ p̂X consists only of formulas in which y occurs free.
Lemma 10 Given a proof predicate Prf , finite set of variables Y , and a proof form {pX(X)},
1. PA ` Prf (pX(X), A(X))→Prf (pXy(Xy), A(Xy)).
2. PA ` Prf (pXy(Xy), A(X))→Prf (pX(X), A(X)) if y is not free in A.
Proof. Argue in PA.
1) Prf (pX(X), A(X)) yields that A(X) coincides with F (X) for some formula F ∈ p̂X .
By monotonicity, F ∈ p̂Xy. It remains to observe that once A(X) syntactically coincides with
F (X), then A(Xy) syntactically coincides with F (Xy). Therefore Prf (pXy(Xy), A(Xy)).
2) Let Prf (p(Xy), A(X)), y is not free in A(X). Then A(X) coincides with F (Xy) for
some formula F ∈ p̂Xy. Since y is not free in A(X), y is not free in F (Xy) either and [F (Xy)]
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is provably equal to [F (X)]. By coherence, F ∈ p̂X . By assumptions, Prf (pX(X), F (X)),
hence Prf (pX(X), A(X)). 2
Note that for each Prf -proof p and each Y , the set of invariant Prf -proofs {p(X) |X ⊆ Y }
as defined in (10) is a legitimate proof form. This is a corollary of Lemma 5 adapted for the
invariant interpretation.
In parametric semantics, proof terms are interpreted as real derivations with a mech-
anism of opening/closing variables, and operations on proof terms as operations on these
derivations. In generic semantics, the analogue of a derivation is a proof form (rather than
a proof function) and we need to define operations corresponding to functional symbols of
FOLP on proof forms. In the future definition of generic arithmetical interpretation (Defini-
tion 14), operations, along with the proof predicate Prf , will be parameters of the definition.
However, we will need a ‘canonical’ example of such operations.
We first define axiliary operations +, ·, !, and genx on proof functions, that is, for proof
functions p(X) and q(X) we will construct proof functions [p+ q](X), [p · q](X), [!p](X), and
[genx(p)](X) in such a way that for each value of X
• [p+ q](X) is the Prf -proof of formulas from p̂ ∪ q̂ and only them;
• [p · q](X) is the Prf -proof of all G such that F → G ∈ p̂ for some F ∈ q̂ and only
them;
• [!p](X) is the Prf -proof of Prf (p(X), pGq) for all G ∈ p̂ and only for them;
• [genx(p)](X) is the Prf -proof deriving ∀xF for all F ∈ p̂ with x 6∈ X and only for
them.
As one can see, no irrelevant formulas occur in the compound proofs: we will call such
operations ‘tight.’ Now we are going to establish two facts: first, that tight operations
applied to proof functions result in a proof function, and that they satisfy specification
axioms of FOLP.
Let x→˙y denote a natural term for the primitive recursive function which calculates
pF → Gq given pFq and pGq. Similarly, let ∀˙xy denote a natural term for the primitive
recursive function which calculates p∀xFq given pFq and pxq.
Lemma 11 Let p(X) and q(X) be provably recursive functions. Then there exist provably
recursive functions [p + q](X), [p · q](X), [!p](X), and [genx(p)](X) such that the following
formulas are provable in PA:
• Prf (p(X), y) ∨ Prf (q(X), y)→ Prf ([p+ q](X), y);
Prf ([p+ q](X), y)→ Prf (p(X), y) ∨ Prf (q(X), y);
• Prf (p(X), y→˙z)→ (Prf (q(X), y)→ Prf ([p · q](X), z));
Prf ([p · q](X), z)→∃y (Prf (p(X), y →˙ z) ∧ Prf (q(X), y));
• Prf (p(X), y)→ Prf ([!p](X),Prf (p(X), y));
Prf ([!p](X), z)→ ∃y (z = Prf (p(X), y) ∧ Prf (p(X), y));
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• Prf (p(X), y)→ Prf ([genx(p)](X), ∀˙xy), x 6∈ X;
Prf ([genx(p)](X), z)→ ∃y
(
z = ∀˙xy ∧ Prf (p(X), y)
)
, x 6∈ X.
Proof. Specific formalizations of +, ·, genx are straightforward. For example, for [p · q](X)
one can take α(β(p(X)) · β(q(X))) where α and β are translators from Proof -proofs to Prf -
proofs and vice versa. Formulas from [̂p · q] are exactly those G for which there is an F in q̂
such that F → G ∈ p̂.
Let us describe how to build [!p](X). We first recall a classical result:
Lemma 12 [Go¨del’s Lemma] (cf. [5, 17]) For each provably ∆1-formula σ(X), there is a
provably recursive function g(X) such that
PA ` σ(X)→Proof (g(X), σ(X)).
The key observation here is that Go¨del’s Lemma can be converted.
Lemma 13 [Two-way Go¨del’s Lemma] For each provably ∆1-formula σ(X), there is a prov-
ably recursive function t(X) such that
PA ` Proof (t(X), σ(X))↔ σ(X).
Proof. Direction ‘←’ is similar to the classical Go¨del’s Lemma. A tedious analysis of the
proof of Go¨del’s Lemma shows that the converse implication is also provable:
PA ` Proof (g(X), σ(X))→σ(X),
which yields the Lemma. However, we offer here an alternative shorter proof of Lemma 13.
Given g(X) from Go¨del’s Lemma, define t(X) to be a natural arithmetical term for a provably
recursive function that is equal to g(X) if σ(X) holds, and to 0 (which is a proof of nothing)
otherwise. Therefore,
PA ` σ(X)→Proof (t(X), σ(X)).
We claim that
PA ` ¬σ(X)→¬Proof (t(X), σ(X))
as well. Reason in PA. If not σ(X), then t(X) = 0, hence t(X) is not a proof of σ(X). 2
Remark 4 In a private discussion of the preliminary draft of this paper, Lev Beklemishev
offered the following alternative proof of Lemma 13. For a given ∆1-formula σ(X), consider
a provably recursive term g(X) constructed in the proof of Go¨del’s Lemma such that
PA ` σ(X)→Proof (g(X), σ(X))
for some g(X) that is the code of the particular proof in PA. Detailed analysis of the con-
struction demonstrates that in fact g(X) is the code of a derivation in Robinson’s Arithmetic
Q. Since this observation is purely syntactical, it can be formalized in PA, that is,
PA ` Proof PA(g(X), y)→ Proof Q(g(X), y).
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But PA proves reflection for Q, in particular,
PA ` Proof Q(g(X), σ(X))→ σ(X).
This gives us the desired
PA ` Proof PA(g(X), σ(X))→ σ(X).
We now proceed with building the proof checker operation ‘!.’ Consider a proof function
(p(X),F). Since for each F , Prf (p(X), F (X)) is a provably ∆1-formula, using Lemma 13,
one can build a provably recursive term t(X) that provides a Proof -proof of Prf (p(X), F (X)),
i.e.,
PA ` Prf (p(X), F (X))→Proof (t(X),Prf (p(X), F (X))).
We can assume that t(X) is a cumulative proof that fits all F ∈ F and hence depends only
on the proof function. By assumptions about generic proof predicates, given a Proof -proof
t(X), we can construct a Prf -proof s(X) of the same set of formulas, i.e.,
PA ` Prf (p(X), F (X))→Prf (s(X),Prf (p(X), F (X))).
We can now take this s(X) as [!p](X). In other words, operation ‘!’ proceeds as follows:
given specific values of X and p, it
• computes n = p(X) and ki = Fi(X) for all Fi ∈ F ;
• builds formulas Gi which are Prf (n, ki);
• finds Proof -proofs g(n, pGiq) of Prf (n, pGiq)’s, by two-way Go¨del’s Lemma;
• finds a Proof -proof of all of these Prf (n, pGiq)’s. There is a computable procedure
which, for a given code of a finite set of Proof -proofs, builds a code of a Proof -proof
that is their sum. This is our t(X);
• and finally, given a Proof -proof t(X), we build an equivalent Prf -proof s(X) and take
it as [!p](X).
It is clear that all the functions constructed in this proof are total recursive. We assume that
formalization of operations is natural, so, PA ‘knows’ that they satisfy the corresponding
specifications. 2
We will now prove that the tight operations defined above, when applied to proof func-
tions, return proof functions.
Lemma 14 Let p(X) and q(X) be proof functions. Then [p+ q](X), [p · q](X), [!p](X), and
[genx(p)](X) are proof functions.
26
Proof. It is clear that property (13) is preserved by operations +, ·, !, and genx and that the
corresponding sets F can be found effectively from the components of the operation. Given
this, we will focus on proving (14). The case of ‘+’ is straightforward. For [p · q](X), reason
in PA. Assume that Prf ([p·q](X), F (X)); then there exists y such that Prf (p(X), y→˙F (X))







(Prf (p(X), Gi(X) → F (X)) ∧ Prf (q(X), Gi(X))) .
From property (14) for p(X) and q(X) we conclude
k∨
i=1
((Gi → F ) ∧Gi).
By propositional logic, we derive F .
Let us check ‘!.’ We have to prove that
PA ` Prf ([!p](X),Prf (p(X), F (X)))→Prf (p(X), F (X)). (15)
Argue in PA. Assume Prf ([!p](X), H(X)). Since operation ‘!’ is tight, H(X) is one of
Prf (p(X), G) where G ∈ p̂. By two-way Go¨del’s Lemma, H(X) holds.
Checking genx. Argue in PA. Assume Prf ([genx(p)](X), F (X)). By the definition of
operation genx, F (X) is ∀xG(X) with x 6∈ X and
Prf (p(X), G(X)).
Since p(X) is a proof function, we have Prf (p(X), G(X))→G. Use generalization on x and
take into account that x is not free in the antecedent. Conclude that
Prf (p(X), G(X))→∀xG,
from which we obtain the desired
Prf ([genx(p)](X),∀xG(X))→∀xG.
2
We are now ready to define operations on proof forms.
Lemma 15 Suppose that Y is a finite set of parameters and P = {pX | X ⊆ Y }, Q =
{qX | X ⊆ Y } are proof forms. Then one can effectively find proof forms P · Q, P +Q, !P
and genxP such that for each X ⊆ Y , the following formulas are provable in PA:
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• Prf (pX(X), y) ∨ Prf (qX(X), y)→ Prf ([P +Q]X(X), y);
• Prf (pX(X), y→˙z)→ (Prf (qX(X), y)→ Prf ([P · Q]X(X), z));
• Prf (pX(X), y)→ Prf ([!P ]X(X),Prf (pX(X), y));
• Prf (pX(X), y)→ Prf ([genx(P)]X(X), ∀˙xy), x 6∈ X.
Proof. Sum ‘+’ is defined as the usual ‘tight’ operation on corresponding proof functions
pX(X); no coordination for different X’s is needed, i.e., [P + Q]X = pX + qX in the sense
of Lemma 14. It is easy to check that P + Q is a proof form, that is, it is monotonic and
coherent.
Application ‘·’ works as follows. For every X ⊆ Y we first calculate [pZ · qZ ](Z) for
each Z ⊇ X. For every such Z, we then find the common Prf -proof tZ(Z) for all formulas
F proven by [pZ · qZ ](Z) which satisfy the condition FVar(F )∩ (Z \X) = ∅. Then we define
[P · Q]X(X) as the tight sum of all such tZ (such a proof can be effectively found by the
definition of a generic proof predicate).
Coherence follows immediately from the condition on free variables in the definition of
application. Let us check monotonicity. Argue in PA. Suppose that Prf ([P ·Q]X(X), F (X)).
By the definition of [P ·Q]X , there is Z ⊇ X such that F does not contain free variables from
Z \X and Prf ([P · Q]Z(Z), F (X)). If y ∈ Z, then Z ⊇ Xy, hence FVar(F ) ∩ (Z \Xy) = ∅
and Prf ([P · Q]Xy(Xy), F (Xy)) by the definition of [P · Q]Xy.
Let y 6∈ Z. We have Prf (pZ(Z), (G→ F )(Z)) and Prf (qZ(Z), G(Z)) for some G. Then,
by monotonicity of P andQ, we obtain Prf (pZy(Zy), (G→ F )(Zy)) and Prf (qZy(Zy), G(Zy)),
hence by definition of ‘·’ on proof functions, Prf ([pZy · qZy](Zy), F (Zy)). Now we have
Zy ⊇ Xy and F does not contain free variables from Zy \Xy, thus, by definition of P · Q,
Prf ([P · Q]Xy(Xy), F (Xy)).
Proof checker. For every X ⊆ Y , we define [!P ]X(X) as the tight sum of [!(pZ)](Z) for
all Z ⊆ X. Monotonicity is immediate since the definition of [!P ]X(X) is monotone with
respect to X.
Coherence. Argue in PA. Suppose [!P ]Xy(Xy) is a proof of A(X) and A(X) does not
contain y free. By definition of [!P ]Xy, A has the form Prf (pZ(Z), F (Z)) for some Z ⊆ Xy,
where F (Z) ∈ p̂Z . Since FVar(A) = Z and Z does not contain y free, we conclude that
Z ⊆ X. Then [!P ]X(X) is a proof of A(X) by the definition of [!P ]X .
Generalizer. Let us extend operation genx to all proof functions p(X). If x 6∈ X, then
[genx(p)](X) is defined in Lemma 11. If x ∈ X, then [genx(p)](X) is equal to 0 which does
not prove anything, so ĝenx(p) = ∅. Reflexivity of [genx(p)](X) follows immediately from
reflexivity of p(X).
Given X ⊆ Y and proof form P , we define [genx(P)]X as the tight sum of [genx(PZ)](Z)
for all Z ⊆ X.
Checking monotonicity. Suppose F (X) ∈ ̂[genx(P)]X . Then F (X) is the result of opening
parameters X in some formula F ∈ ̂[genx(PZ)]. By definition of the operation genx, and since
Z ⊂ {Xy}, F (Xy) ∈ ̂[genx(P)]Xy.
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Let us check coherence. Suppose F ∈ ̂[genx(P)]Xy and y 6∈ FVar(F ). Then F ∈
̂[genx(PZ)] for some Z ⊆ Xy such that x 6∈ Z.
Case 1: Z ⊆ X. Then F ∈ ̂[genx(P)]X by the definition of [genx(P)]X .
Case 2: Z = Z ′y where Z ′ ⊆ X and y 6∈ Z ′. Then F is ∀xG for some G ∈ [̂PZ′y]. Since
x 6∈ Z, we have that x 6∈ Z ′ and x does not coincide with y. From the latter it follows that
G does not contain y free, and by coherence of P we have G ∈ P̂Z′ . Then F ∈ ̂[genx(PZ′)],
hence F ∈ ̂genx(PX).
This concludes the description of the canonical example of operations on proof forms; we
will refer to these operations as ‘tight cumulative operations.’ 2
Definition 14 A generic arithmetical interpretation of the language FOLP is
• a proof predicate Prf , finite set of variables Y , and operations {+, ·, !, genx} on proof
forms which satisfy Lemma 15 for each X ⊆ Y ;
• an evaluation ∗ that maps proof variables and constants p to proof forms {pX(X)}
and predicate symbols of arity n to arithmetical formulas with n free variables. We
suppose that ∗ commutes with renaming of individual variables.
For each X, interpretation ∗ commutes with Prf -operations on proofs, the Boolean con-
nectives, and quantifiers. For proof assertions,
(t:XF )
∗ = Prf (t∗(X), F ∗(X)).
Theorem 6 [Soundness Theorem] If FOLP ` F with a constant specification CS, then for
every generic arithmetical interpretation ∗ respecting CS, PA ` F ∗.
Proof. Validity of axioms A1–A3 of FOLP follows immediately from our assumptions con-
cerning proof forms. Provability of B1 is guaranteed by the definition of a proof function.
The arithmetical translation of the remaining axioms B2–B5 is provable due to the definition
of a proof form. 2
Generic proof forms provide yet another semantics of proofs for FOLP hence for HPC.
Since each (invariant) parametric evaluation is generic, the generic provability semantics is
the strongest, followed by the invariant, and then parametric semantics.
Example 5 Let us check that the explicit Barcan formula
∀x(p:{x}A(x))→ genx(p):∀xA(x),
in which p is a proof variable and A(x) a unary predicate letter is not valid in generic
provability semantics. Fix the set of variables Y = {x}, the standard proof predicate Proof
with ‘tight’ operations from Lemma 15, and define A∗(x) as ¬Proof (x, p⊥q) which is a
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provably ∆1-formula. By Lemma 13, there is a provably recursive term g(x) such that for
each x it returns the code of a proof of A(x). Moreover,
PA ` Proof (g(x), A∗(x))→A∗(x). (16)
Consider a proof function g(x) with ĝ = {A∗(x)}, i.e., A∗(x) is the only formula proved
by the proof function g(x); this ensures (13). It is a proof function, since (14) also holds.
Indeed, argue in PA. If F (x) = A∗(x), then reflexivity for F holds by (16). Otherwise, by
(13), ¬Prf (p∗(x), F (x)), and reflexivity holds again.
Now we fix Y = {x} and define a proof form G as the set of proof functions g∅ = 0 and
g{x}(x) = g(x). We will also need a 0-proof form Z in which z∅ = z{x} = 0.
Define p∗ to be G, and u∗ to be Z for all other atomic proof terms u, and use tight
cumulative operations to obtain a generic interpretation ∗.
We argue that under this interpretation ∗, the explicit Barcan formula is false. Indeed,
its antecedent,
∀xProof (g(x),¬Proof (x, p⊥q))
is true, by Go¨del’s Lemma, whereas its succedent,
Proof (f(v)∗, p∀xA∗q),
is false since ∀xA is equivalent to the consistency of PA.
Example 6 Let us check that
¬∀xA(x)→∃x¬A(x)
(A(x) is atomic here) is not valid with respect to the generic provability semantics. Its Go¨del
translation (in an equivalent simplified form (·)◦, cf. [18], Section 9.2.1) is equivalent to
2¬2∀xA(x)→ ∃x2¬2A(x). (17)
Note that (17) is provable in PA if 2 is interpreted as the provability operator ‘there
exists a proof that . . ..’ Indeed, since PA ` 2¬2ϕ→2¬2⊥, the antecedent of (17) implies
2¬2⊥, which, by the formalized Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, is equivalent to
2⊥. In modal logic, 2⊥ → ∃x2¬2A(x), which shows that (17) is provable in PA under
the provability understanding of 2. This observation demonstrates that the formal provabil-
ity reading of modal operators does not conform to intuitionistic logic in terms of Go¨del’s
translation.
Our goal now is to demonstrate that under any normal realization of (17), there is a
generic arithmetical interpretation that renders its realization not provable in PA.
A normal realization of (17) has the form
u:¬s(u, v):∀xA(x)→ ∃x t(u, v):{x}¬v:{x}A(x) (18)
for some s and t. Given s and t, we will find an interpretation ∗ such that the antecedent
of this formula, [u:¬s(u, v):∀xA(x)]∗ is true, but the succedent, [∃x t(u, v):{x}¬v:{x}A(x)]∗ is
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false in the standard model of PA. This would yield that (18) is not provable in PA under
interpretation ∗.
As in Example 5, A(x) will be interpreted as ¬Proof (x, p⊥q). So Proof (k, p∀xA∗q) is
false for each k since ∀xA∗ is equivalent to the consistency of PA. Let g(x) be a proof function
from Example 5 in which A∗(x) is the only formula proved. Define v∗(x) = g(x), v∗ = 0,
u∗(x) = u∗ = puq, and p∗ = p∗(x) = 0 for all other atomic proof terms p.
Consider the following fixed-point equation that defines a new proof predicate Prf (x, y).
Prf (x, y) ↔ Proof (x, y) ∨ [x = puq ∧ y = p¬Prf ([s(u, v)]∗, p∀xA∗(x)q)q]. (19)
For the purposes of the fixed-point equation, what matters is that [s(u, v)]∗ can be effectively
computed given ∗ and the Go¨del number of Prf .
From (19) it immediately follows that Prf (x, y) is provably ∆1. Moreover, it is also
provable from (19) that each Proof -proof is a Prf -proof of the same formulas. The only
new Prf -proof is puq and it proves formula ¬Prf ([s(u, v)]∗, p∀xA∗(x)q) which is a true ∆1-
formula and hence also Proof -provable. Therefore, Prf and Proof prove the same formulas,
and there is an easy computable translation from Prf -proofs to Proof -proofs and vice versa.
In particular, v∗(x) = g(x) is a proof function for both Proof and Prf .
We can now define proof function fu as follows. The first component is the constant
function puq. The second component is a singleton
{¬Prf ([s(u, v)]∗, p∀xA∗(x)q)}.
Since ¬Prf ([s(u, v)]∗, p∀xA∗(x)q) is provable, fu is reflexive and hence a legitimate proof
function. Let us set fu(x) to coincide with fu (in particular fu(x) does not really depend on
x). Let U be the proof form {fu, fu(x)}.
Using tight cumulative operations, we obtain a generic interpretation ∗ which interprets
v as G, u as U , and all other atomic proof terms p as Z. It remains to observe that under
interpretation ∗, the antecedent of (18) is true and the succedent of (18) is false. Indeed, by
(19), u∗ is a Prf -proof of ¬Prf ([s(u, v)]∗, p∀xA∗(x)q). On the other hand, for each n ∈ ω,
v∗(n) as a Proof -proof of A∗(n). Therefore,
Proof (v∗(n), pA∗(n)q)
holds. Since Prf extends Proof , it follows that
Prf (v∗(n), pA∗(n)q)
is true for each n. Therefore, its negation is never provable, hence [∃x t(u, v):{x}¬v:{x}A(x)]∗
is false.
We have shown that ¬∀xA(x)→∃x¬A(x) fails in the generic semantics of proofs.
8 To what extent is FOLP a BHK-semantics?
We argue that the first-order logic of proofs, in combination with Go¨del’s translation,
conforms to BHK-semantics. First, the proof objects in FOLP have natural provability
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interpretations as PA-proofs. Assuming a certain amount of good will from the reader5, we
will try to check that FOLP complies with BHK clauses.
• A proof of A → B is a construction which, given a proof of A, returns a proof of B.
An intuitionistic implication A→B is realized in FOLP as t:(A˜→ B˜) where A˜ and B˜
are FOLP-versions of A and B respectively. By ‘application’ axiom B2,
t:(A˜→B˜) ∧ u:A˜→ [t·u]:B˜,
and t is indeed a construction that, given a proof u of the antecedent of the implication,
returns a proof t·u of the succedent.
• A proof of A∧B consists of a proof of A and a proof of B. An intuitionistic conjunction
A ∧ B is realized in FOLP as t:(A˜ ∧ B˜) where A˜ and B˜ are, as before, FOLP-versions
of A and B. This t contains sufficient information to recover both a proof of A˜ and
a proof of B˜. Indeed, given such t and commonly known proofs a and b such that
a:((A˜ ∧ B˜)→ A˜) and b:((A˜ ∧ B˜)→ B˜), one can find a proof of A˜, a·t, and a proof of
B˜, b·t. Likewise, having a proof of A˜ and a proof of B˜, one can construct a proof of
A˜ ∧ B˜ within FOLP.
• A proof of A ∨ B is given by presenting either a proof of A or a proof of B. Argue
in FOLP. Suppose u :A or u :B. We have to construct a proof term t(u) such that
t(u):(A ∨ B). Consider the internalized disjunction principles a:(A→ (A ∨ B)) and
b:(B→ (A ∨ B)), both obviously provable in FOLP. Using application axiom B2, we
conclude that either [a·u]:(A ∨B) or [b·u]:(A ∨B). In any case,
[a·u+ b·u]:(A ∨B),
and we can set t(u) to [a·u+ b·u].
• A proof of ∀xA(x) is a function converting c into a proof of A(c). An intuitionistic
statement ∀xA(x) is represented in FOLP as u:∀xA˜(x).6 By Example 1, we can conclude
that
∀x(d·u):{x}A˜(x)
with d such that d:(∀xA˜(x)→ A˜(x)). A provability interpretation of the latter produces
an arithmetical term (function) f(x) such that
∀xPrf (f(x), A˜∗(x)).
Therefore, a proof term u indeed yields a function f(x) that converts any c into a proof
f(c) of A˜(c).
5which is always necessary when an informal requirement is compared to a formal condition
6Here, and in the next item, we suppress parameters other than x for brevity.
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• A proof of ∃xA(x) is a pair (c, d) where d is a proof of A(c). An intuitionistic statement
∃xA(x) is represented in FOLP as u:∃xA˜(x). Since A˜(x) is a realization of a modalized








By the application axiom B1,
[s·u]:(∃x[!t]:{x}A˜(x)),
which, under any arithmetical interpretation ∗, becomes an assertion that a specific
derivation (s·u)∗ is a proof of a Σ1-formula
∃xPrf ((!t)∗(x), A˜∗(x)).
Such proof assertion yields a specific number n such that
Prf ((!t)∗(n), A˜∗(n)),
i.e., that (!t)∗(n) is a proof of A˜∗(n) which confirms to the corresponding BHK require-
ment.
9 Completeness is not attainable
In this section, to simplify formulations without a loss of generality, we consider the
languages of LP and FOLP without proof constants and logics LP, FOLP without the axiom
necessitation rule. Let PAR, INV, and GEN be sets of FOLP-formulas valid under the para-
metric, invariant parametric, and generic semantics correspondingly. Negative results from
[4] rule out a complete axiom system for GEN. From what we have already learned, it follows
that
FOLP ( GEN ( INV ( PAR. (20)
We now show that neither PAR nor INV is recursively enumerable, hence neither can be
effectively axiomatized.
Theorem 7 Neither GEN, PAR, or INV is recursively enumerable.
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Proof. For simplicity, we present the proof for the parametric semantics; the same argument
works in other cases as well.
Consider the set of FOLP-formulas F of the form ¬p:F , where F is a pure first-order
formula and p is a proof variable. From the definition of (parametric) arithmetical interpre-
tation, it follows that for each formula F ,
¬p:¬F ∈ PAR if and only if for all ∗, PA 6` ¬F ∗.
To prove Theorem 7, it remains to demonstrate that the set
F = {F | F is a first-order formula and for all ∗, PA 6` ¬F ∗}.
is not recursively enumerable.
Let FO be the set of first-order formulas that are valid in all models (this set coincides
with first-order logic). Let FIN be the set of formulas that are valid in all finite models and
FIN be its complement. It is obvious that FO ⊂ FIN, hence FO ∩ FIN = ∅. The following
lemma holds (cf. [6]).
Lemma 16 [6] FO and FIN are recursively inseparable.
Note that FO ⊆ F ⊆ FIN. Indeed, if F is a first-order theorem, then, for each interpretation
∗, PA ` F ∗, hence PA 6` ¬F ∗; this secures FO ⊆ F . Suppose F 6∈ FIN. Then F is false
in some finite model M. Since each finite model can be represented in PA, this yields an
arithmetical interpretation ∗ for which PA ` ¬F ∗, hence F 6∈ F . We conclude that F ⊆ FIN.
Therefore F separates FO and FIN and, by Lemma 16, F is not decidable. It is easily
seen from the definition of F that its complement F is recursively enumerable. Therefore F
is not recursively enumerable. 2
The following corollary could be obtained from (20), but Theorem 7 offers a deeper
analysis.
Corollary 6 FOLP is not complete with respect to any of the aforementioned provability
semantics: parametric, invariant parametric, or generic.
10 Discussion
The arithmetical semantics of the propositional logic of proofs LP corresponds to the
generic provability semantics of FOLP with Y = ∅7. This yields the following conservativity
result: for a formula F in the LP-language, LP ` F iff FOLP ` F . Indeed, LP ` F
yields FOLP ` F since LP is subsumed by FOLP. Suppose LP 6` F . By the arithmetical
completeness theorem for LP (cf. [2]), there is an arithmetical (generic) interpretation ∗ such
that F ∗ is false. By soundness of FOLP, Theorem 6, F is not derivable in FOLP.
7In the arithmetical semantics for LP from [2], operations +, ·, and ! are not tight but property (14) holds
nevertheless because proof forms are all propositional.
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Similar classes of tautologies can be considered for the propositional language: PARp,
INVp, and GENp. GENp coincides with LP. INVp is strictly included into PARp (separated by
Example 3). It is plausible that INVp also coincides with LP and that this can be established
by a proper adaptation of the arithmetical completeness proof from [2].
FOLP may be viewed as a general-purpose justification logic; it opens the door to a
general theory of first-order justification in which we anticipate a variety of FOLP-like systems
equipped with appropriate epistemic semantics.
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